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The purpose of this article is not to deal with the American policy 
towards Poland in all its aspects. In  consideration of the enormous 
material about Poland, the key country in the American policy 
towards Eastern Europe, that would be a stupendous task. The pri- 
mary aspect here is the conflict between Soviet and American goals. 
Main themes will be questions such as these: What role did American 
policy makers want the United States and the Soviet Union to play 
in Polish affairs? What Polish govermnents were acceptable to the 
United States and what were the criteria for acceptability? 
The relationship between the Roosevelt Administration and the 
Polish Sikorski Government-in-exile was generally quite good. In the 
period from 1941 to Sikorski's death in the middle of 1943 the Polish 
Prime Minister was received in Washington three times. More im- 
portant signs of support were the granting of Lend-Lease and other 
forms of economic aid to the Sikorski Government. The Polish 
Premier also received some encouragement in Washingon for his 
plans for an East European federation, plans which very easily could 
be regarded as anti-Soviet measures. 
The most important question for the Poles was the dispute with 
the Soviet Union over the border line between the two countries. 
The American policy on such territorial issues was to have them post- 
poned until after the war. Such a course had many sources. What is 
most important in this connection is that such a policy had to lead 
to a sharper conflict with the Soviet Union than with Poland. This 
was so because the Russians pressed hard to have a final decision in 
favor of the 1939 border line as soon as possible. And, as Hull has 
stated, one element behind the Amer;cans wanting all territorial 
questions postponed until after the war was opposition to the Soviet 
Government's "tren>endous ambition with regard to Europev. This 
indirect support for the Polish side also showed in the successful 
hnerican attempt to have a:] references to territorial questions re- 
moved from the Anglo-Soviet treaty of 1942. But none of these ac- 
tions ixeant that the United States ha$ taken any definite side as 
regards the Polish-Soviet differences. And the American policy inak- 
ers did not yet have to come down on anyone of the two sides, since 
Soviet-Polish relations were still relatively friendly. 
As the Soviet Union c a m  to play a very central part in the war 
agaiilst Germany, the position of the United States shifted from one 
of indirect support to the Poles to one of attempted neutrality. In 
late 1942 and early 1943 Polish observers became more and more 
worried about this tendency even if it did not yet openly show in 
any of the nos t  important questions. But the Roosevelt-Eden con- 
versations in March 1943 clearly indicated the direction of American 
policy on the confidential level. Aithough it is not quite clear whether 
Rooaevelt in those talks agreed with Eden on the Curzon Line as 
the most preferable Polish-Soviet border, the drift of his thinking 
was that P o l a d  should not be allowed to destroy Great Power 
harixony in the post-war .world. If that meant that something like 
the Curzon Line would have to be accepted, FDR seemed willing to 
do it. 
011 April 25, 1943, the Soviet Union broke off diplomatic rela- 
tions with the Sikorski Government. What finally led to this rupture 
was the Polish request for an international investigation of the cir- 
cumstances around the many dead Po:ish officers found in Matyn 
Forcst. The American rcaction to the break off in relations was two- 
edged. Roosevelt made it clear that the US would continue to main- 
tain relations with the Sikorski Government, and he refuted Soviet 
accusations about Sikorski having ccllaLoratec1 with the Germans. 
But FDR refused, mole than Churchill, to make an issue out of the 
rupture and eniphasi~ed his disagreement with the way the Poles 
had handled the affair. The United States also declined a Polish 
request, supported by the British, that the US handle Polish interests 
i l  the Soviet Union after relations had been broken off. 
As the Polish issue became increasingly controversial the Ameri- 
cans tried to escape taking sides by pursuing a policy of disinterest. 
The State Department pointed out that it was natural for Britain 
to take the lead in resolving the Polish-Soviet dispute. The resulting 
policy of often refusing to take sides could in some cases have con- 
sequences different from the intencled. When Hull for instance did 
not want to apply ally pressure on the Polish Government to change 
its composition by eliminating the most anti-Soviet members, this 
could of course not be interpreted as a policy giving equal emphasis 
to both sides. Neither could tile State Department's attempt to solve 
the question of c i t i z e d i p  for those living in the disputed Soviet- 
Polish borderland, w i t h o ~ ~ t  going into the merits of the territorial 
problem, be considered as anything else than indirect sup2ort to the 
Poles. This was pointed out both by Ambassador Stanley in Moscow 
and even by Hull himself, when he said that the basis for the Ameri- 
can stand was "an action taken by the Soviet Government which 
has the effect of unilaterally forcing hundreds of thousands of citi- 
zens of another United Nations . . . to become Soviet citizens regard- 
less of what the desire of the persons affected might be." But on 
the other hand the military aid the United States had sent to Poland 
during most of 1913 was called off in the wake of the October 
Conference in Moscow. 
While Hull and the State Department tried to follow a nonpartisan 
policy in the Polish-Soviet dispute but still showed some bias in 
favor of the Poles, FDR himself pursued a course where harmony 
among the Great Powers was the most predominant feature. But i t  
was not by any means the only feature. Some recognition had to be 
shown towards the Poles, especially when their claims had strong 
support from the large bloc of Polish-American voters. Such pressure 
from different directions was often resolved by FDR by following 
an ambiguous policy. In  the case of Poland this led to one side of 
the coin being shown to the Poles and their supporters in the United 
States and another side being used in high-level diplomacy behind 
the scene. 
This second side was exemplified by the talks with Eden in March 
1943 and again in May of the same year when President Benes of 
Czechoslovakia visited Washington. And after having given Hull 
some indication of his thinking on Poland's eastern border, Roosevelt 
at Teheran was for the first time personally confronted with the 
insistent Sovier demands in this question. After Rooseveit had pointed 
out that he could not enter into any binding cominitments 
because "there were in the United States from six to seven million 
of Polish extraction, and as a practical man he did not wish to lose 
their vote", FDR gave Stalin the impression that he would in the 
end probably agree to the Soviet demands. This was done by Roose- 
velt without afterwards giving any informatior about it to his own 
%ate Department, a factor which was to give even less ccherence 
to an already tangled American policy in the Polish ques~ion. 
After Teheran Roosevelt again left the initiative in the Polish 
border question with Churchill. When Churchiil ~ :an ted , to  postpone 
the planned visit to Washington by the new Polish Premier, Mila-  
lajczyli, in order to pressure the Poles to accept the Curzon Line, 
Roosevelt complied with this. This was of course indirect support 
for the British point of view. But the only thing that night  have 
sufficed to persuade the obstinate Poles would have been open Ameri- 
can associatioll with Churchill's effort. That was out of the question 
for FDR, especidlly in an election year. When Mikolajczyli a-sked 
Roosevelt directly about his attitude on the border problem, the 
American President did modify his previous stand of having all 
territorial questions postponed until after the war. But when it came 
to applying direct pressure on the Poles FDR only said that "This 
Government recognizes that recent developments present certain 
complex and vital consideratioils which may render it desirable for 
the Polish Goverllinent to endeavor to reach a solution with regard 
to its territory without delay." 
The same American hesitancy due to conflicting pressure also 
showed up in the question of the composition of the Polish Govern- 
ment. While wanting to continue recognition of the Mikolajczyk 
Government, Roosevelt indicated both to Stalin and to Churchill that 
he would favor an elimination of the most anti-Soviet members from 
that Goverilment. But at the same time FDR wanted the Poles to  
do this reorganization without outside pressure. 
In  June 1944 Roosevelt finally received Mikolajczyk in Washing- 
ton. After having extracted a promise from him that he would noi 
disturb the electoral campaign in the US, Roosevelt was more blunt 
to the Premier than he had ever been before. FDR openly stated the 
infportance of inaliing some changes in the set-up of the London 
Government. OR the border question he told Mikolajczyk that es- 
sential concessions would haye to be made even if Lwow and a 
surrrounding area ought to be retained by the Poles. But the President 
took much of the bite out of these recommendations by clearly dis- 
associating himseif from the Curzon Line advocated by Stalin and 
Churchill and by the r a d m  extravagant praise he lavished on the 
Premier. The resumption of American arms deliveries to Poland and 
the open encouragement Mikolajczyk received from Hull and Stet- 
tinius in the State Department weakened the new features of FDR's 
policy even further. 
The dualism in Roosevelt's policy was again illustrated by the 
lukewarm support he gave to Mikolajczylr's visit to the Soviet Union. 
Only after Churchill had intervened more forcefully was the Polish 
Premier received in Moscow. The point about Lwow, which had 
somewhat encouraged Miltolajczylt, was considerably watered down 
when presented by Harriman to Stalin. 
The Polish visit to Stalin was completely overshadowed by the 
insurrection in Warsaw. The Soviet refusal to aid the uprising or 
even to give permission for American planes to use the shuttle- 
bombing bases in the Soviet Union to drop supplies to the Warsaw 
insurgents, had to lead to a straining of Soviet-American relations, 
especially when the Russians in the course of one week refused two 
American and one joint Roosevelt-Churchill request for support 
to Warsaw. But FDR did not want to follow Churchill's proposal 
that the Americans just make use of the Russian bases without any 
permission having been granted. 
What is equally important in this connection is that FDR even 
during the Warsaw insurrection kept up his vague pressure on Miko- 
lajczyk to reach some sort of settlement with Stalin on the territorial 
and governmental issues. For the first time Roosevelt even tried to 
induce the Premier to reach an agreement as well with the Soviet- 
sponsored Polish Committee of National Liberation, a step which to  
Mikolajczyk, with considerable exaggeration, meant the President's 
"acceptance of the Lublin Poles as the bona fide leaders of the na- 
tion." The Warsaw uprising thus led to  no important change in the 
two-pronged American policy towards Poland of on the one hand 
keeping a low American pof i le  and on the other applying some 
pressure for a settlement on both parties, but gradually most on the 
Poles. This latter part was more pronounced with Roosevelt than 
with Hull and his State Department. 
Even if Great Power harmony counted more with Roosevelt than 
the case of the Mikolajczyli Government, FDR's campaign for a 
fourth presidential term increased the leverage of the Poles. In  an 
effort to line up the important Polish-American vote Roosevelt had 
to give considerable, general lip service to the Polish side. But that 
Great Power harmony was what counted most with the President 
was illustrated by his policy in connection with Churchill's October 
visit to Moscow, a visit which coincided with the height of the 
election campaign. While publicly proclaiming his general support 
for the Poles, Rooievelt gave Churchill an almost: free hand in his 
talks with Stalin. On  the question of Poland's eastern border, that 
meant virtual acceptance of the Curzon Line, After the British Prime 
Minister had cabled FDR about British-Soviet agreement on the 
Curzon Line and about the probability of the Lublin Committee 
receiving at least half the posts in a newly planned and reorganized 
Polish government, Roosevelt said in reply only that he was delighted 
over the progress madc and that "When and if a solution is arrived 
at I should like to be consulted as to the advisability from this 
point of view of delaying its publication for about two weeks. You 
will understand." The President made no reservation as to the con- 
tents of what he might be willing to accept. We only wanted to make 
sure his re-election would not be disturbed. 
But during the h/Ioscow meeting the discrepancy between what 
Roosevelt had said to Mikolajczyk and what he had said to Stalin 
became clear to the Poles. This occured when the Russians used FDR's 
Teheran stand, or their interpretation of it, to force an agreement 
from Mikolajczylr on the Curzon Line. The revelation came as a 
shock to the Polish Premier who sent FDR a letter in order to have 
the conflicting American positions clarified. Roosevelt took no apt' lon 
on the letter until after his re-election. On  November 17 he finally 
told Mikolajczpk: "111 regard to the future frontiers of Poland, if mu- 
tual agreement on this subject, including the proposed compensation 
for Poland from Germany is reached between the Polish, Soviet, and 
British Governments, this Government would offer no objection." 
B~zt since it had not proved possible for FDR to have the problem 
solved by others so he could avoid taking sides, Harriinan was 
instructed to make a last appeal to Stalin for the retention of the 
Lwow area with the Poles. After the fall of the Mikolajczyk Govern- 
ment the plan about a last appeal to Stalin was tenlporarily given up. 
While Roosevelt considered the question of Poland's borders to 
be of relatively little importance, the resignation of Mikolajczylr 
was a hard blow for American interests in the more important prob- 
lem as to what government Poland was to have. The United States 
continued its recognition of the London Poles, but the support given 
to the new Arciszewski Government was only marginal. The Aineri- 
cans clearly did not want to jeopardize their standing with a future 
government in Warsaw by giving more than token support to  what: 
was evidently considered an unrepresentative and short-lived London 
exile group. The British took the same attitude. 
While Roosevelt had tried to play the Polish border question in 
such a way as not to provoke any major dispute with Stalin, this 
tactic was more difficult in the key goverimental problem. The 
American policy centered around Milrolajczylr and his Peasant Party. 
The Russians obviously gave increasing preference to the Lublin 
group. And in late 1944, when the Soviets and their Polish supporters 
controlled most of Poland, this dispute flared up. On  December 16 
Roosevelt sent Stalin a message in mrhich he tried to prevent Soviet 
recognition of the Lublin Poles before the planned Yalta meeting. 
This was unsuccessful, and on January 5, 1945, the Soviet Union 
entered into formal diplomatic relations with the Lublin Government. 
FDR had already emphasized that there would be no American 
recognition of the Lublin Committe and that "this is in no sense 
due to any special ties or feelings for the London (Polish) Govern- 
ment." At the same time the President had pointed out that Milro- 
lajczyk "is the only Polish leader in sight who seems to offer the 
possibility of a genuine solution of the difficult and dangerous Polish 
question." Now Roosevelt also publicly voiced his concern about 
the Polish situation, 
American opposition to the Lublin Committee was based on a 
belief that i t  represented a clear minority of the Polish population. 
Furthermore, Americans had an inlpression that i t  was controlled 
by Moscow. There was even in early January some reaction against 
the agrarian reform the Lublin Committee had carried out in areas 
it controlled. And as the State Department prepared for the Yalta 
Conference it placed highest priority on a policy of equal oppor- 
tunity for all foreign interests to carry on business activities in Poland. 
I t  could hardly be expected that such goals would be advanced by 
the Lublin Committee. 
Instead, American co-operation with Milrolajczyli became increas- 
ingly manifest. At the end of Januarp the ex-Premier was told that 
Roosevelt wanted him as Prime Minister of the future government 
of Poland. And the American lists of Poles acceptable for inclusion 
in a new Polish Government were put forth only after close co- 
ordination with the Peasa-nt Party leader. The State Department 
emphasized before Yalta that "we should use our full influence to 
see that the Polish Peasant Party, the largest in the country, and its 
leader, Miliolajczyk, are given an opportunitp to take a leading role 
in any interim arrangements which may be made pending full libera- 
tion and free elections." 
But at Yalta several factors had to Le taken into account which 
tended to modify the American aversion towards the Lublin Com- 
mittee. Roosevelt still placed Great Power co-operation as his supreme 
goal. Only then could his a!!-important plans for a world organiza- 
tion work. Additional points of strength for the Soviet Union in 
the Polish question were the American desire for Soviet participation 
in the war against Japan and the fact that the Soviet Union already 
controlled Poland. The latter element mas illustrated by FDR's com- 
ment in answer to pressure exerted on him for a more ambitious 
American policy towards Poland: " Do you want me to go to war 
with R~mia? ' '  Roosevelt thought that the Soviet Union was the 
preponderant power in Eastern Europe and that little could be done 
to challenge Soviet policies effectively. And if FDR wanted 110 
major confrontation with the Soviet Union almost any agreement on 
Poland would be better than a prolongation of the status quo under 
the Lublin Committee. 
All these elements contribute to an understanding of the modifica- 
tions the American position underwent during the Yalta Conference. 
The plan for a Polish Presidential Committee was rather quickly 
dropped, and on the third day of negotiating the American side 
presented the comproixise proposal which was to become the basis 
of the final agreement. While the British wanted to lessen the role 
the Americans had assigned to I,ublin, Roosevelt worked hard on 
papering over the points of disagreement, considering them lllostiy as 
"a matter of drafting" 
Both the Soviet Union and the Government of London Poles 
considered the Yalta agreement a victory for Lublin, What Roosevelt 
and the State Department thought is not quite as clear. Roosevelt, 
and Truman as well, saw that no clear-cut agreement had been 
concluded. I t  was obvious thalt it c o d d  be stretched and it ~ I L I S ~  also 
haye been thought probable that it w o d d  be stretched by the Soviet 
Union dealing, as it would, from a position of strength. And from 
the key sentence of the Yalta Protocol which states that "The Provi'- 
sional Government which is now functioning in Poland should . . . 
be reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of 
democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad", it is 
difficult to escape the conclusion that this was a victory for Lublin 
and that i t  was probably even seen as such by Washington. In late 
March Roosevelt told Churchill that "as clearly shown in the agree- 
ment, somewhat more emphasis (is placed-G.L.) on the Lublin 
Poles than on the other two groups from which the new Government 
is to be drawn." 
I t  is not likely that this meant a writing off of Poland to the 
Soviet Union. Here it was hoped that the clause on elections in Poland 
would be one guarantee against sucl~ an eventuality. The United 
States and Britain succeeded in having inserted in the agreement a 
point on free and unfettered elections "as soon as possible". But 
decisive in this connection were the arrangements for supervision of 
the elections. While the United States in the first Ya.lta meetings 
gut  great stress on the respor,sibility for electoral supervision being 
placed directly with the Ambassadors of the three Great Powers, the 
American delegation later on had to water down this clause con- 
siderably. Again the British objected in vain to the American conces- 
sions. The final Protocol only said that the Great Powers and Poland 
"will exchange Ambassadors by whose reports the respective Govern- 
ments will be kept informed about the situation in Poland." 
O n  the basis of what had transpired regarding Poland's eastern 
border since the Teheran Conference, the Soviet Union played a very 
strong hand in insisting on the Curzon Line. FDR only made a rather 
repeatedly bound himself to the Curzon Line any departure from 
it  depended on Stalin's magnanimity. That meant that there was only 
marginal digressions from the Line. Poland was to receive substantial 
compensation in the West, but nothing definite was decided on this. 
The scene now shifted from the heads of government at Yalta to 
the Commission in Moscow charged to consult with Polish leaders 
about "the reorganisation of the present Government". Contrary to 
what was formerly thought, the views of the United States and Great 
Britain must now be said on quite a [ew occasions to have diverged 
in this Commission. For almost a month there was Anglo-American 
disagreement over questions such as the British proposal to send a 
high level mission to Poland to prepare elections, over the American 
idea of a political truce inside Poland, over the arbitral position of 
the Commission, and finally over the British request that any Pole 
was to be invited by the Commission unless all of its three members 
objected. 
Important as these points were they can easily be exaggerated. 
And it is not correct, as maintained by some, that the American side 
wanted to start consultations with the L~tblin Poles without first 
having obtained agreement on what other Poles were to be invited. 
On  this point both the State Department and the Foreign Office 
reversed the stand initially taken by their Ambassadors in Moscow. 
Even more important was the Alglo-American agreement that the Lu- 
blin Poles were to have no veto on the names of other Poles invited. 
What is most in focus for this article is what kind of idea the 
Americans had for the coinposition of the new government. This 
is difficult to answer as regards the first month and a half of the 
Commission's work, sizce it never came even close to discussing that 
question. The composition of the group to be called in for consulta- 
tions about the future government gives the best indication for an 
answer, despite the American contention that those called in for 
consultation would not necessarily be included ih the government. 
The first British-American proposal wo~?ld  have given non-Lublin 
Poles a clear majority in the consultations. As this position came 
under strong Soviet pressure, Harrirnan and the State Department 
seemed io be willing to settle [or an even split between Lublin and 
non-Lublin Poles. But American-British support for Mikolajczyk as 
the key Polish politician continued unabated during the drawn-out 
negotiations. Not  only was he included on all the American lists of 
names submitted for inclusion in the consultations, but these same 
lists had been worked out in close understanding with Milrolajczyk 
himself. Even if the State Department disliked the conditions the 
Peasant Party leader set for participation in the Moscow consulta- 
tions, i t  was not willing to have him excluded if he did not give 
up his deinailds. And the question of veto for Lublin over which 
other Po!es were to be invited to Moscow-the most important 
single point holding up the consultations-was really a question of 
the place Mikolajcayk was to occupy ir, the preliminaries and later 
on in the government itself. 
On  March 19 the disputed ~ o i n t s  between the United States and 
Britain were finally cleared up, but the more basic questions between 
these two powers on the one side and the Soviet Union on the other 
still reinained unsolved. In an effort to break the deadlock Roosevelt 
sent Stalin at the end of March a message about Poland which had 
been worked out in cooperation with Churchill and was supported 
by him. In that message the r e spo~~s ib i l i t~  for the impasse was put 
squarely 011 the Soviet Union, and in his interpretation of the Yalta 
agreement Roosevelt said: "While it  is true that the LuLlin Govern- 
ment is to be reorganized and its rnembers play a prorninent role, 
i t  is to be done in such a fashion as to bring irito being a new govern- 
ment . . . I must make it quite clear to you that any such solution 
which would result in a thinly disguised continuance of the present 
Warsaw regime would be uilacceptable and would cause the people 
of the United States to regard the Yalta agreements as having failed." 
In  his answer Staiin said that the United States did not give the 
Lublin Poles their rightful position after what had been agreed upon 
a t  Yalta, and instead he proposed that the Yugoslavian model be 
transferred to Poland. This was generally interpreted to mean that 
the non-Lublin Poles would be given only one of five Cabinet posts. 
The last weelis of Franklin Roosevelt's life represented a toughening 
of the American attitude towards Poland and was best illustrated 
by the previously mentioned telegram and by the President's last 
cables to Churchill. Several of FDR's foreign policy collaborators 
have also told about this change in his policy. Although Polish 
developments-a dislike to follow up the Yalta decisions in the face 
of growing Soviet control in Eastern Europe-played 2. prominent 
part in this tougher America11 attitude towards the Soviet Union it 
was by no means the only factor. 'l'he acrimonious Soviet-American 
exchange over alledged German peace feelers in Italy and what was 
felt to be Soviet down-grading of the United Nations by not sending 
Molotov to the San Francisco Conference were also very important 
in this contlectian. 
This tougher American policy was continued by Truman in liis 
message to Stalin only a few days alter his inauguration. Truman 
first proposed what would amount to L u b h  and non-Lublin Poles 
both having four representatives in the Moscow consultations. How- 
ever, under pressure from the Bririsb, this arrangement w ~ s  changed 
to a five to three conlposition in favor OF the non-Lublin side. Stalin 
of course interpreted this to be in conflict with the previous!y agreed 
upon principle that the Lublin Poles were to play a prominent part 
in these cons~dtations. Even inside the State Department some thought 
that the proposed five to three situation in the consultations might 
very well be in conflict with the Crimea decisions. 
The dispute over the l'uture government of Poland was further 
intensified by the coilclusion of an agreement on mutual assistance 
between the Soviet Union and the L~:blin Government, by the Soviet 
attempt to have Lublin represent Poland at San Francisco, and also 
by the Russians allowing "their" Poles take control of the territory 
all the way to the Oder-Neisse line. 
The result of all this was that the concessions the United States 
had made on Poland at Yalta were pushed in the background. This 
could easily be done since the agreements clearly left room for 
different interpretations. In  the preparations for Molotov's visit to 
the United States only Stiimon and Marshall, of Truman's key foreign 
policy advisers, counselled caution in the Polish question. Truman 
himself in a rather rude manner told Molotov to stick to the Crimea 
decisions on Poland and also made it clear to the Soviet Foreign 
Minister that economic aid to the Soviet Union would be tied to 
co-operation shown in political questions. This insistence of Truman 
on the Russians adhering to concluded agreements was somewhat 
inconsisteut with the President's pronouncement that these same 
agreements with the Soviet Union "had so far been a one-way street 
and that this could not continue." What now was uppermost in 
Truman's mind was a desire to stand up to the Russians in an 
emphatic way. 
A t  the end of April the climate in the Polish dispute improved 
somewhat when Stalin agreed to Mikolajczyk's taking part in the 
consultations, after the Peasant leader had published satisfactory 
declarations of his support for the Crimea decisions. On  the first 
day of May Stet t ini~~s and Iiarritnan formulated what they con- 
sidered the absolute minimum the Americans could accept. This limit 
was one-third representation in the government for the non-Lublin 
Poles. And Mikolajczyk would have to be included in this third 
which was to be controlled by him. 
The presentation of this minimum plan was by Molo- 
tov's statemcnt on May 3 that 16 prominent Poies who had been 
declared missing had actually been imprisoned by the Russians. This 
led to a British-American reaction which included postponement of 
further talks on Poland, a postponement the British hoped would 
last until the Potsdam meeting. But the Americans did not want the 
suspension of talks to last that long, and Eden even feared that the 
State Department might agree to the Yugoslav precedent which Stalin 
had repeatedly insisted on. 
At  the end of May Truman lifted the suspension of the Polish 
talks by sending Hopkins to A/loscow. While there, he and Stalin 
agreed on the list of Poles to be invited for consultation. Of the 
twelve names they selected five must be considered to  have definitely 
favored Lublin, four could be counted in Milrolajczyk's camp, while 
the last three were found somewhere in between. In the subsequent 
consultations two o i  the last three came to support Lublin. O n  the 
question of release or amnesty for the 16 imprisoned Poles nothing 
definite was reached, and concerning elections and political freedom 
in Poland the result was even more vague. 
While the composition of the actual government was to be left to  
the Poles themselves, the main outline could be foreseen after agree- 
ment on the consultation kist. Hopkins also stated that "he knew 
that President Roosevelt and President Truman had always antici- 
pated that the members of the present Warsaw regime would con- 
stitute a majority of the new Polish Provisional Government." A 
satisfactory settlement of the voting rules for the United Nations 
Organization did of course make such an admittance easier to make 
for Hopkins. 
The Mopkins talks were very probably not part of any intricate 
American plan for  a "delayed showdown" with the Soviet Union. 
Although the American attitude towards Poland gradually toughened 
after the end of March, the new policy did not exclude an American- 
Soviet compromise. The results Hopkiizs obtained in Moscow were 
clearly within the limits of what had earlier been defined as the 
American minimum. And with some resignation even Churchill 
agreed that Hopkins "has obtained the best solution we could hope 
for in the circuinstances." 
Having agreed upon the list of appropriate names, the Americans 
discovered that their leverage during the consultations was relatively 
limited. The Poles reached agreement on Lublin controlling two- 
thirds of the new government, and although this was somewhat worse 
than the Americans had probably hoped for, the United States was 
now bent on disposing of the festering Polish problem. This could 
be done more easily since, in addition to the American minimum of 
one-third representation lor Mikolajczyli and his supporters, the 
Moscow negotiations had also resulted in a reaffirmation of the 
Potsdam clause on free elections. On  July 5 the United States, 
supported somewhat reluctantly by Britain, extended recognition to 
the new Polish Government after the Poles had "recognized in their 
entirety the decisions of the Crimea Conference on eke Polish ques- 
tion." 
Even if the State Department had warned even before the Yalta 
Conference that an interim government dominated by Lublin might 
prevent establishment of a democratic regime, this American recogni- 
tion of a Lublin-dominated Government did not mean that American 
policymakers had given up hopes for developments in Poland taking 
a course acceptable LO them. As Ilarriman cabled from Moscow in 
late June: "It is impossible to ~rtredict the trend of events in Poland 
but I believe the stage is set as well as can be done at the present 
time and that if we continue to take a. sympathetic interest in Polish 
affairs and are reasonably generous in our economic relations there 
is s fair chance that things will work out satisfactorily from our 
standpoint." To follow up this advice Harriman urged that the 
American Ambassador be sent to Poland as soon as possible after 
the formation of the new government, and he also encouraged the 
Poles to seek economic assistance from the United Sta.tes. 
I n  preparing for the Potsdam Conference the State Department 
generally accepted Harriman's advice that the United Sta.tes try to 
use its economic leverage to further its interests. The Department 
commented: "Imincdiate action on our part to facilitate by credits 
and otherwise the supplying to Poland of urgently needed equipment 
and relief materials will promote in a far-reaching and enduring 
manner a healthy American influence in Poland, especially in regard 
to the holding of free elections." EIarriinan occasionally showed even 
more optimism about what could be done through American financial 
credits. I t  was quite clear that American political and economic 
goals could best be advanced "through support of Mikolajczyk and 
his fellow democratic ministers in the new governinent . . ." These 
economic favors were not to be given free of charge. In  addition 
to free elections the State Department emphasized equal opportunity 
for all nations in Polish trade and investment. 
Since the question of a new gsvernnxnt had already been solved 
before the Potsdam me~tiilg it was only superficially discussed during 
that meeting. Aside from the question of Poland's western border 
the most important problem for the United States a t  Potsdam was to 
extract new and better guarantees for free elections. As at Yalta the 
US wanted to put most of the responsibility for the elections on the 
Great Powers, but Stalin succeeded in making elections almost ex- 
clusively dependent on the Polish authorities. Again the Western 
powers had to measure such limited gains against a prolongation of 
the status quo. 
This is not the place for any discussion of the problem of Poland's 
western border, since that was intimately connected with the policies 
of the Allied Powers towards Germany. But one motive for the 
American opposition to the Oder-Western Neisse and even to the 
Eastern Neisse was that such borderlines would lead to a high degree 
of Polish dependelice upon the Soviet Union. However, since the 
United States gave ~ r i o r i t y  to an agreement on reparations from 
Germany which would give the Soviet Union a minimum of influence 
in the Western zones, Byrnes in his so called "package deal" had 
in return to give the Poles the administration of all territory up to 
the Western Neisse. Mikolajczyk also supported the easternmost line, 
and 1lmerica.n non-recognition of the Western Neisse would un- 
doubtedly have weakened Loth his and American position in Poland. 
The Protocol said that the final delimitation of the frontier should 
await the peace settlement. But this reservation was not really brought 
forth again on the American side until concern for the fate of Ger- 
many became of exclusive importance, as evidenced by Byrnes' 
Stuttgart speech of September 1946. The Potsdam decision really 
represented a de facto territorial settlement. 
To support both Miliolajczyk and American interests in Poland 
the State Department, together with the American Ainbassador to  
Poland, Bliss Lane, drew up a comprehersive program of economic 
aid for the Poles. Poland was to receive extensive relief supplies 
from UNRRA and to be offered surplus war imterial, and credits 
f r ~ m  the Export-Import Bank were to be made available "provided 
the Polish Government would provide us with the necessary informa- 
tion about its financial situation." 
But even before any of this aid, with the exception of UNRRA 
supplies, had been extended to Poland, the United States had met 
with so many points 01 irritation on both the political and economic 
f ro~l t  that its willingness to give aid to Poland was significantly 
reduced. And Bliss Lane's determination "to take advantage of the 
cagerness of the Polish Government for economic assistance and to 
use it as a lever isy which we could obtain fulfillment of Polish 
commitments under the Yalta and Potsdain decisions, . . ." met with 
difficulties when the Poles did not show quite the eagerness for aid 
which Bliss Lane had hoped for. 
The first American complaints involved Polish state control over 
exports and imports as well as the introduction of a system of mul- 
tiple rates of exchange which was highly unfavorzble to the dollar. 
In  the economic sphere oE things the Americans raised a host of 
complaints over Polish barter agreements with the Soviet Union, 
over the procedure the Poles followed in nationalizing property 
where American interests were involxred, over the lack of highly 
favorable treatment accorded American nationals and corporations 
in Poland, and over the failure of the Poles in furnishing the United 
States with the terms of their commercial agrcexxnts with other 
countries. In the political field the United States complained about 
the lack of freedom both for the Polish and the foreign press, and 
about the activities of the Polish Security Police. Finally there were 
increasing Ainerican doubts as to the possibility of holding free 
elections in Poland. 
Even if the State Department had both political and economic 
points of complaint towards the Poles, the economic side seemed to 
be most important for the hesitant American attitude on Polish 
credits in late 1945. I11 November Byrnes instructed Lane that "Dept. 
at  present inclined to view that in general, economic rather than 
political questions should be tied to Exim-bank credit negotiations 
. . ." This economic primacy stemmed from several factors. Economic 
interests were in themselves important in the conduct of American 
foreign policy. There was also considerable doubt about the leverage 
the United States could exert in political as opposed to economic 
matters. One additional consideration was probably that the econoinic 
grievances were more explicit than the political ones. As a result, 
they were more open and sensitive to eventual objections from the 
United States. There was even for some time relative satisfaction 
with political developments in Poland. While in London, Byrnes in 
September recommended the Polish procedure 01 setting up a new 
government for use as well in Rumania. And despite periods of 
pessimism Mikolajczyli. believed that developments in Poland would 
take a different turn from that in the most heavily Soviet-controlled 
areas. Furthermore, the United States issued only an oral protest 
against one of the more manifest abuses of the Polish Government, 
the banning of the minor political parties. This mild reaction was 
partially due to the fact that the parties were small and that their 
internal composition reflected their various activities and stances 
during the course of the war. I t  was also due to Mikolajczyk's 
estimation that the ban on small parties would strengthen his Peasant 
Party. But at the end of January 2946 Byrnes followed up a statement 
from Bevin openly condemning political murders in Poland, though 
only after considerable pressure froin Senator Vandenberg. 
Poland was unconditionally given large supplies of aid from the 
American-don~inated UNRRA organization so that in the end Po- 
land, next only to China, was the country to receive the greatest 
amount. But after months of indecision the State Department finally 
made up its mind in January-February of 1946 as to exactjy what 
concessions it wanted to extract from the Poles in return for financial 
support. The six points presented to Warsaw included Polish support 
for the principles of free trade and the US Proposals for Expansion 
of World Trade and Employment, extension of most favored treat- 
ment to the United States, adequate and effective compensation for 
nationalizations of American property, and Ainerican access to full 
information on the international econolnic relations of Poland. The 
sixth and the only political condition was an explicit Polish reaf- 
firmation of the Potsdam election commitment. If the Department 
received full satisfaction on these six points, the Poles were to be 
granted a 50 million dollar Export-Import Bank credit. To receive 
more the Poles would have to comply with additional points, but 
even if they did not adhere to the six points they might still receive 
a credit of 25 million dollars. Bliss Lane indicated his oppositon to 
this plan. H e  wanted a tougher Alnerican policy. A credit to buy 
American surplus property was only indirectly tied to these conces- 
sions, since the United States had considerable interests in disposing 
of its surplus property. 
Lane's opposition to credits was intimately connected with his 
evaluation of the politica! situation in Poland. 111 March 1946 he 
had come to feel that very little could be done to prevent Poland 
from slipping co:.np!etely under the control of the Soviet Union. 
The best thicg to do, in Lane's opinion, miould bc to start educating 
the American public on the Soviet danger, so as to make it possible 
to conduct a more forceful American foreign policy. Great Britain 
also pressed for a harder American policy towards Poland. The 
United States, however, showed little willingness to protest some 
minor sceps the Poiish Government took to consolidate its control, 
since such protests w o d d  probably only be brushed off as inter- 
ference in the internal affairs of Poland. However, in April 1946 
there was liztle doubt that the State Departnlent took a bleak view 
of the possibility for free elections Prer being held in Poiand. 
On April 24 the United States and Poland exchanged notes 
granting Poland a 40 million dollar credit from the E x p o r t - I n ~ ~ o r t  
Bank in addition to 50 mil!ions to buy US surplus property. In  
rcturn the Poles had agreed to all of the five economic conditions 
the State Department had stipulated in January-February. O n  the 
question of free elections the United States had to settle for a uni- 
lateral Polish reaffirmation of the Potsdam article which stated 
that "the general elections m7ill take place this year". Despite such 
Polish concessions both Great Britain and Ambassador Lane definitely 
opposed the extension of these credits. Lane interpreted the credits 
as an expression of non-confidence in his evaluation of Polish events, 
and the British described the Polish concessions as mere paper com- 
nlitments which the Polish Government most likely would not live 
up to. 
The State Department also had doubts about the Poles complying 
with the agreements, especielly the statement on free elections. But 
Byrnes evidently had some hope that at least the economic clauses 
could be fulfilled, since the Poles had indicated interest in further 
credits. These would then depend upon completion of the concessions 
made. One more reason for the extension of credits was that the 
Export-Import Bank loan was to be used in the coal industry. This 
might then give Western Europe some of the coal it vitally needed 
and could draw Poland away from a one-sided orientation towards 
the Soviet Union. 
The objections to the 90 million dollar grant to Poland had 
evidently strengthened already existing doubts within the Depart- 
ment. But only two weeks after the exchange of notes Lane was 
able to persuade Byrnes to withhold all but the four million dollars 
of the surplus credit already given to the Poles. The final American 
signature on the Export-Import Bank loan was also withheld. The 
official reason for this suspension of further aid to Poland was that 
the Poles had not kept their promise of publishing the notes of 
exhange of April 21. Furthermore, the Poles had not supplied in- 
formation on their economic treaties with the Soviet Union. Both 
Byrnes and Acheson, however, clearly hoped that this suspension 
would lead to political inlprovements "in view of the rapidly 
deteriorating political conditions in Poland." I t  was now felt that 
free elections had become even more of an impossibility. And the 
British kept pressing for a tougher American policy. 
However, since the Poles had already been promised credits in 
return for certain specified economic concessions, it was diffjcult 
now to increase conditions which had already been agreed upon. 
Therefore, at  the end of May the State Department said that suspen- 
sion of surplus property deliveries would be lifted upon assurance 
that the United States would be furnished with the Polish economic 
treaties. When these treaties had been received the Export-Jinport 
loan would be signed. At the time of this s ta teme~~t  the notes of 
exchange of April 24 had already been published in the Polish press. 
On  June 26, only four days before the important referendum 
in Poland, the State Department approved the restoration of the 
surplus credit. And on August 9 it was announced that final arrange- 
ments were made for the Export-Import Bank credit. 
By that time the very limited leverage afforded by America's 
strong economic position had been clearly illustrated in the referen- 
dum on constitutional and econoinic reforms and on the Oder-Neisse 
border. Lane reported extensive falsification of the returns, and on 
August 19 the United States forma!!y protested to Poland against a 
referendum which was felt to be a trial run for the methods to be 
used in the long-postponed election. 
This negative evaluation of events in Poland coincided with an 
American reappraisal of Eastern Europe in general. Primarily as a 
result of the voting pattern a t  the Peace Conference, Byrnes had 
come to feel that the whole area was dominated by the Soviet 
Union. In late September the Secretary of State sulnmed up the 
situation in this way: ". . . the time has now come, I am convinced, 
in the light of the attitude of the Soviet Government and the neigh- 
boring states which it  dominates in varying degrees, when the imple- 
mentation of our general policies requires the closest coordination. 
In  a word we nx~s t  help our friends in every way and refrain from 
assisting those v h o  either through helplessness or for other reasons 
are opposing the principles for which we stand." 
By now Poland was clearly on the wrong side in the Cold War, 
while on the other hand Germany was steadily increasing in impor- 
tance. One result of this was reawakened interest in the question 
of Poland's western border, as finally determined by the Peace 
Conference. Byrnes' Stuttgart speech was an effort to strengthen 
the position of the United States in Germany at the expense of the 
ambiguous Oder-Neisse policy of the Soviet Union. The Russians 
now fully had to support the Poles. The new American Oder-Neisse 
policy was extremely unpopular in every quarter in Poland, but 
Germany was more essential to American interests than Poland. 
Equally important was the fact that the United States had a strong 
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position to protect in Germany, while it had lost almost everything 
in Poland. 
In early October Lane cabled from Warsaw the terms he wanted 
the Poles to fulfill in return for new credits. These ternis were so 
stiff that he did not actua1:y think that much could be obtained. 
The dominating power in Poland was the Soviet Union, and changes 
would primarily have to be cffected from Moscow. And obviously 
the United States did not really expect the Russians to change their 
established course. Both the US and Britain now abandoned as well 
their policy of wanting supervisioti of the Polish elections. These 
would in all probability be rigged, and ineffective supervision would 
only lead to Western responsibility for the falsified rcsults. In late 
November the Americans sent the Poles a note in view of "the 
disturbing reports . . . received concerning the preparations for the 
elections . . ." 
But despite this course of development in Poland the State Depart- 
ment did not want Mikolajczyk to boycott the election or to play 
up pre-elecdon abuses in such a way that they could lead to an 
outright ban on his participation. Mikolajczyli's withdrawal would 
probably only Lc used to strengthen the Communists' claim that the 
Peasant Party lacked popular support, while his defeat in a rigged 
election left the possibility open for protests on various levels. In  
its most optimistic moments thc State Department even seems to have 
wondered whether Mikolajczyk could not make a relatively strong 
showing in spite of electoral irregularities. But the last reports the 
American Embassy in Poland sent to Washington in 1946 did not 
leave much hope ot this. In  fact, on the very last day of the year Lane 
cabled that "In view of arrests, intimidations et cetera it  is now 
possible Government bloc may triumph even should voting and 
counting procedure be correct." 
This American dissatisfaction with pojitical developments did not, 
as one would have cxpected, lead to an end to all Polish-American 
contacts on finalxial assistance. Even after Byrnes' abrupt halt in 
September of aid to Czechoslovakia-a country which was far more 
independent-the State Department entered into financial negotia- 
tions with the Poles, And that was done despite American protests 
over what had happened even to the April promises on adequate 
and effective compensation- 
But in the end the Poles did not obtain much. Polish assets which 
had been blocked in the United States were released in return for 
a new and general understanding concerning compensation for na- 
tionalized American property. After some hesitation and struggle 
within the State Department, the Poles were finally told that the 
credits they had asked for would have to wait until after the election. 
This was a victory for tliose in the Department who did not want 
to extend any assistance to the Poles if they did not hold free elec- 
tions. Ambassador Lane had initially belonged to this group, but 
later came to change his views. Byrnes and Under Secretary of State 
Acheson also seem to have had doubts 2s to how wise it was to tie 
American credits to free elections, 
The fact that Poland, even as !ate as 1916, enjoyed a special 
position in Eastern Europe by having contacts with American authori- 
ties for purposes 01 credit arrangements was mainly due to one 
circumstance connected with the Polish request. Both Byrnes and 
several others in the State Department gave the Poles special treat- 
ment because the loan was to be used to increase coal production 
which in turn could be used to reduce the coal shortage in Western 
Europe. Even the British, who earlier had tried to induce the Ameri- 
cans not to give economic assistance to Poland, favored a coal credit 
if this would increase exports to Western Europe. The diffic~dty in 
having such a guarantee written into any aid agreement was probably 
one reason for the credit in the end being tied to the holding of the 
elections. 
This economic-political connection meant the end of the last Polish 
hopes for credit. When it came to political standards Poland clearly 
did not justify any departure from the now entrenched American 
policy of not giving economic aid to Eastern Europe. In early Janu- 
ary 1947, before the Polish election, the United States first sent a 
note to the Soviet Union and then one to Poland which in fact said 
the Americans did not think there was any possibility that the up- 
coming election would be free. After the election had been held the 
State Department sent out a statement saying that what it had 
feared would happen had now come true. I n  early February Truman 
lectured the new Polish Ambassador on his Government's failure to 
live up to the Yalta and Potsdam commitments, and in March Bliss 
Lane resigned as American Ambassador to Poland. in order to "speak 
and write openly, without being hampered by diplomatic convention, 
regarding the present tragedy in Poland." 
While all econonlic assistance for Poland had been stopped, the 
Poles still received huinanitarian aid from the United States. In 
February 1947 Trunxm cvcn declared that with the exception of 
Hungary, Poland would be the only eligible country in Eastern 
Europe for participation in thc large-scale national American pro- 
gram to succeed the IJNRRA organization. Hungary was included 
for political reasons connected with the death struggle of the Nagy 
Government, while Poland probably was on the list of qualified 
countries since it was the one country in Europe which had received 
the largest aid from UNRRA. To have excluded Poland would have 
meant America's giving up all pretentions of the new program being 
anything more than an instrument in the struggle with the Soviet 
Union. But after Poland refused to take part in the Marshall Plan 
program its eligibility was withdrawn from the 350 million dollar 
huinanitarian scheme. The new Anlerican Ambassador to Poland 
soon concluded that Polish-American relations were frozen and that 
the "only purpose in being here is  just to show the people that we 
are here." 
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John Cuowe Ransom 
VAUNTING OAK 
H e  is a tower unJeaning. But how will he not break, 
If i3raven assault him with full wind and sleet, 
And what  uproar tall trees concunlbent make! 
More than a hundred years, morc (than a hundred feet 
Naked he rears against the cold skies eruptlive; 
Only his tenlporal twizs xre unsure of seat, 
And the frail leaves of a season, which are susceptive 
Of the mad humors of wind, and turn aqd flee 
In  panic round the sten1 on which they are captive. 
N o w  a certain heart, too young and mortally 
Linked with an unbeliever of bitter blood, 
Observed, as a n  c ~ r i n e n t  witiless of life, the  tree, 
And exulted, wrapped i q  a phantasy of good: 
>>Be the great o& for its long winterings 
O u r  love's symbol, better 1th.n the summer's brood.,, 
Then the venerable oalr, delivered of his pangs, 
Put  forth profuse his green banners of peace 
And testified t o  her with innumerable tongues. 
And what  but she fetch me i:p to the steep place 
Where the oalr vaunted? A flat where birdsong flew 
H a d  to be traversed; an& a quick populace 
Of daisies, and yellow kinds; and here she knew, 
Who had been instructed of much mortality, 
Better than brag in this distraught purlieu. 
Above the little and their dusty tombs was h:: 
Standing, sheer on his hill, not inach soiled over 
By the lrnolbs and broken boughs of an old tree, 
An,d she murmured, >Established, you see him there! forever.2 
But, tha t  her pitiful error be undone, 
I knocked on his house loudly, 2 sorrowing lover, 
And drew forth like a funeral a hollow tone. 
>,The old gentleman,, I grieved, ,>holds gallantly, 
But before our joy shall have lapsed, even, will be gone., 
I lrnoclred more sternly, and his dolorous cry 
Boonled till its loud reverberance outsounded 
The singing of bees; or the coward birds that fly 
Otherwhere with their songs when summer is sped, 
And if they stayed would perish miserably; 
O r  the tears of a girl remembering her dread. 
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